Threat Assessment Of Pro Khomeini Shiite Activities In The U.S., 24 February 1984

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Description of document: FBI Monograph: Threat Assessment of Pro-Khomeini

Shiite Activities in the U.S., 24-February-1984

31 -October-20 11
1 9-September-2008

19-December-201 1
27 -September-2008

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Record Information/Dissemination Section
170 Marcel Drive
Winchester, VA 22602-4843

Second release begins on (PDF) page 53 and reveals
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the original release

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

September 19, 2008

Subject: THREAT ASSESSMENT OF PRO-KHOMEINI
SHIITE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.

FBI MONOGRAPH

FOlPANo. 1109734-000

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5,
United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure,
with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was
inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked

below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552 Section 552a

8(b)(1) D (b)(7)(A) 0(d)(5)

8(b)(2) 0(b)(7)(B) D(j)(2)

D (b)(3). B (b)(7)(C) o(k)(1 )

8(b)(7)(D) 0(k)(2)

n (b)(7)(E) o(k)(3)

0(b)(7)(F) D(k)(4)

o(b)(4) □ (b)(8) o(k)(5)

o(b)(5) 0(b)(9) o(k)(6)

8(b)(6) o(k)(7)

47 page(s) were reviewed and 47 page(s) are being released.

n Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other
Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

□ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.

□ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this
information when the consultation is finished.

b You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in
writing to the Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425
New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the
date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information
Appeal” or “Information Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it
may be easily identified.

n The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was
the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other
individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown,
when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s).
Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be
reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

a See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

The enclosed material is responsive to your FOIA request to FBI Headquarters.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

(b)(1)

(b)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(4)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)

(b)(8)

(b)(9)

(d)(5)

0X2)

OOO)

00 ( 2 )

00(3)

(k)(4)

00(5)

(k)(6)

(k)(7)

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency;

personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records or information ( A ) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual;

contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a
information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce
crime or apprehend criminals;

information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or
privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity
would be held in confidence;

material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant
to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian
employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished
information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the
release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person
who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FBI/DOJ

fpij ^

m

$

Memorandum

I DATE: ^5-16*2008 j
CLASSIFIED BY 60322/UCLRP/PLJ/SDE
REASON: ..

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-16-2033

HoEgiZ^ f r

2#24>;84

/A TafRE AT^ ASSESSMENT OE&PRO-KHOMEINI
V ^jSHII TEL.AC TltQcTIE S^I N^UNTTM^TSTE S -
^TERRORIST RESEARCH AND A^ALYTICAlfMN

Renter (trac) , operational matter-

Ek«c AO Adm.

E**e AD Inv..'

E».c’XO LES _
Aset. Dir.:

Adm. Sarvc. *

Crlm. Inv.

Idant.

Insp. *

Intsll.

Lab.

Legal Coun.

Off. Cong. &
Public A /Is. _

R#e. Mgnt.

Tech . Servs. —

Training

Telephone Rm. _
Jbsctof’i See*y .

(uy°

To submit attached s umma ry7^"Tl^e v a : t KEr As
Pro-Khomeini Activities In The United States."^)

“PURPOSE :

^COMMENDATION : (in That this summary be approved for dissemination
\rr~~ to the intelligence communi ty.

APPROVED; Adm.Sorvs Laboratory — /

'yH

AI*PROVED:

Director

Exac. AD-Adm..
Exec. AD-inv.
Excc. AD-LE3 .

Adm. Servs*.
Crlm. Inv/|2

Want.

; Inspection
Intcll.

■'Legal Ccun. _
Off. o' Cong.

& public Affs

Rac. Wont. _
Tech. Serve. _
Training

C

ALL IHFORfMTIOHCOMT/fcfi
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED^-
EXCEPT. V ; H E R E S H 0 V; ! &l o>

OTHERWISE bl g

a

to the increased q

-DETAT-LS : Attached summary was prepared in response to the increase

activity of pro-Khomeini Shiite terrorist groups against
United States interest in the Middle East and the threat of such
activity occurring in the United States. TRA.C has undertaken this
project to determine the threat potential to the continental
United States. M <U)

-This project has been coordinated by
Intelligence Research Specialist, TRAC, Terror
Investigative . Division

riminal

SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

jj*Warni

Warning Notice

National Security
Information

Nof orn

Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved

■ (Ui

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

(U)

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

Orcon (OC)

Not releasable to Contractors or kr/.
Contractor/Consultants — (U)

9 / . - — |

I ^Dissemination and Extraction of /

Information Controlled by Origlnatoy A

DATE: 05-22-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 603.22/LRP/PLJ/SDB

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-22-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-22-2003

CLASSIFIED BY 60322/LRP/PLJ/SDB

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-22-2033

SE^T/NOFORN

THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF PRO-KHOMEINI SHIITE
ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Dat

— /

Date of Information:

January 1984

(U)

This communication is classified
unless otherwise indicated.

"Sec^^^oforn"

in its entirety.

SECRET
CLASS r
DElZLAS,

(OFORN

.ED BY G-3

FY ON : OADR

ir> r- oo

SECHKT/NOFORN

Within the past year, terrorist acts have been
committed in the Middle East against diplomatic establishments
and military bases of the United States and several of its
allies. These actions, the purpose of which is to rid the
area of the Multinational Forces, have resulted in- extensive
damage and in numerous deaths and injuries. Beirut, Lebanon,
has been the principal site of much of this activity, although
other Middle East states have not escaped the actions of the
terrorists .

(U)

The group that generally has claimed credit for these
acts is a fanatic fundamentalist sect of th^ gfslamic Shiite
' religion . whose leader is Ayatollah Khome ini of— t ]re = f 'sd'am-fc^e public
o^-~rran- — 3 This group, Islamic Jihad, is one of several factions
of tlfe 3 religion that consider themselves to be in a holy war.
Although not all Shiites adhere to this philosophy, those who
do, believe that no sacrifice is too great in furtherance of
their cause. rSn (yj

The United States is one of several nations viewed as
an enemy by the fanatic Shiites in their struggle, and there is a

seghet/noforn

I.

THE SHIITE RELIGION

secMt/noforn

SECHET/NOFORN

The major terrorist problem currently confronting
the United States in the Middle East is based in a deep
religious fanaticism found in the fundamentalist sect of
the Islamic Shiite faith. The soa*ritual leader of the world's
Shiites, the Ayatollah RuhollahyKhomeini , who is also the
temporal lea dWF^of ' ^IflT^I'sTamrc^^^pub'ri' tf^o! 23 ! ra n , serves as the
manifestation both of this religious fervor 'IncT'secular power.
Fanatic fundamentalist Shiites are in a state of holy war against
those in opposition to their philosophy, which includes the
United States. As such, they believe that salvation can be
obtained through martyrdom. Centuries ago, during the Crusades,
this was accomplished by attacks with knives; i^od^y the same is
gained by use of explosives-laden trucks.

The Shiite Moslems represent the Iranian, or Persian,
variation of the Islamic religion. The beginnings of Islam can
conservatively be traced to the prophet Mohammed in the sixth
and seventh centuries A. D. His teachings unified the majority of
the Arab world and caused the Koran (the words of Mohammed) to
be held as law in both civil and religious matters. An
important aspect of Islam is that there is no discernable
distinction between church and state. Interpretation of the
religion is used to legitimize the state.

Following the death of Mohammed in A.D. 632, there
resulted a succession of struggles in the faith. A schism,
which continues into the present, occurred between two religious
leaders, Ali and Abu Bakr. The followers of Ali, the Shiites,
appear to adhere more closely to the actual teachings of the
Koran as law. The other group, the Sunnites, who possibly are
the followers of Abu Bakr, appear to be more liberal and
realistic. The Shiite sect differs from the Sunnite sect in
matters of law and ceremony. They have, moreover, rejected
most of the oral traditions of Islam and believe in the coming
of a Messiah. iTha Sunnite sect is considered the orthodox branch
of Islam. WofMU)

The Sunnites are the majority Islamic sect, comprising
85 per cent of all Arabs. Most of the Moslems in Turkey, the
Far East, Afghanistan, and Africa, are Sunnite. The Shiites, by
comparison, are centered in Iran (formerly Persia) where approxi-
mately 90 per cent of the population (1979 estimate) belong to
the sect. Other important Shiite communities exist in Iraq,
Yemen, Pakistani, and Oman. (U)

(U)

H-

SE'

1T/NOFORN

^fe£^T/NOFORN

The Sunnites, historically, have held positions of
leadership in the Middle East and have dominated the wealth.

The rise to power of Khomeini in' 1979, however, began to change
this. Khomeini has sought to move Shiites into leadership roles
in the states of the Persian Gulf by any means, including
violence. This Islamic Revolution, therefore, is an attempt
to spread the Shiite interpretation of Islam through political
destabilization of other Arab states. (1J)

The fundamental concept of the Shiite philosophy
emphasizes strict obedience to the religious leader, that is,
Khomeini. His followers are faithful to his views and perform
and act accordingly. This fundamentalist zeal, when combined
with an intense Persian/Iranian nationalism, has given rise to
several fanatic factions, to whom no sacrifice is too great.

As Khomeini has justified the use of violence to further the
Revolution through his strict interpretation of the religion and/or
the Koran, the religion (or its interpretation) becomes the
justification for any act. And, to be sure, Khomeini's inter-
pretation is unquestioned. Thus, it is not the religion itself
but the interpretation of religious teachings, as viewed by the
spiritual/temporal leader, which is the driving fo^ce behind
the Islamic Revolution and its consequences.

(X

(U)

(S)

As part of his effort to expand and consolidate the
Islamic Revolution, Khomeini has provided aid to dissident groups
in neighboring Gulf states and has trained agents for attacks
against exiled regime opponents. Tehran’s subversive acts are
most likely used to protect Iran's own revolution and to foster
the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist regimes sympathetic to
Iranian interests. They are also designed to reduce superpower
afluencp in the Mirfrnp rwr OC) u&f sj pX Lsr uai (U]

CUTOUT I 80 , 0t- I— (U)

In its commitment to spreading the I slamlcKRe volution,
the Khomeini Government has been heavily involved in training and
equipping Islamic fundamentalist groups for the subversion of
several Gulf countries, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and
Iraq. Available information indicates that Iran has run, at
least since 1981, special paramilitary/ terrorist training camps
under the direction of the Revolutionary Guards. (NC, OC) C^T (U)

QAWjgj* <U)

Not all Shiites are fanatic to the point of self-sacrifice.
Indeed, there are Shiites who accept Khomeini as a religious leader,
and even as a political leader, but who are not involved in the
terrorism. Thus, there exists within the Shiite philosophy a range
of followers encompassing, on one extreme, those who treat their
belief solely as a faith and, on the other extreme, those who
willingly martyr themselves to enforce and expand the teachings of
Khomeini. ^ ^ (U)

SEb^T/NOFORN

hi

bZ

back of page

SE^ET/NOFORN

^ET/NOFORN

14

:t/noforn

Although there have not yet been terrorist attacks
by Shiite fundamentalists in the United States, there have
been numerous allegations relative to such activity. Increased
security measures have been put into effect at numerous United
States Government offices and buildings as a result, and
priority investigations have attempted to determine the validity
of the information and/or to interdict any threats. To date,
none of the intelligence has been substantiated. Included among
these allegations are:

SEC^T/NOFORN

15

'sfc^^T/NOFORN

- information obtained^

(S)

[

regarding an anonvmous...teiebnonfe? cam

bl

warning or pofesibiS K&WilkaZfe- Style attacks

against famous "houses" in the United States, to

mid- January 1984, at the United Nations Building,
Pan Am Building, World Trade Center,

Federal Building, in New York City;

SlSGR^T/NOFORN

X \ 6

SEQftET/NOFORN

(S)

- information obtained on December 30, 1983,
from a source of unknown reliability that

time frame was indicated;

- information obtained from an anonymous source

No

- information, which has not been substantiated,
advising on January 4, 1984 of rumors of a plot
for a kamikaze-style mission against United States
installations (NFI) . Reportedl y, the ni 1 nt is

T.ehenese and is assnriatPH wi thf

by Khomeini

group supported

- informatio n from a source of unknown rel lability
who reported I

^ A

- information obtained on January 18, 1984 that
package bombs have been prepared to explode when
in the possession of United States Postal Service
employees;,*^ jjj)

- information obtained from a n anonymous t elephone
call on January 19. 1984 thatl I

b7D

b7D

bl

b7D

b7D

T/NOFORN

17

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535
October 31, 2011

Subject: THREAT ASSESSMENT OF PRO-KHOMEINI
SHIITE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S./FBI MONOGRAPH
FOlPANo. 1109734-001

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5,
United States Code, Section 5521552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure,
with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was
inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked

below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552 Section 552a

13 (b)(1) □(b)(7)(A) Q(d)(5)

□(b)(2) c (b)(7)(B) °(j)(2)

□(b)(3) 8(b)(7)(C) □(k)(1)

8(b)(7)(D) Q(k)(2)

°(b)(7)(E) D(k)(3)

0(b)(7)(F) n (k)(4)

□ (b)(4) n(b)(8) D (k)(5)

□ (b)(5) Q(b)(9) □(k)(6)

8(b)(6) 0(k)(7)

47 page(s) were reviewed and 47 page(s) are being released.

□ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other
Government agency(ies) [OGA], This information has been:

□ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.

□ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this
information when the consultation is finished.

□ In accordance with standard FBI practice, this response neither confirms nor denies the
existence of your subject's name on any watch lists.

e You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the
Director, Office of Information Policy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW,

Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001. Your appeal must be received by OIP within sixty (60) days
from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly
marked “Freedom of Information Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA Number assigned to your
request so that it may be easily identified.

□ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was
the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other
individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown,
when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s).
Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).
If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be
reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

e See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

As a result of your administrative appeal to the Office of Information Policy (OIP), Department of Justice
(DOJ), material was remanded to the FBI for declassification review. The material from the FBI Headquarters file 199-
4773 has been reviewed for declassification and processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A
redacted copy of the documents is enclosed.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

(b)(1)

(b)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(4)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)

(b)(8)

(b)(9)

(d)(5)

0X2)

00 ( 1 )

(k)(2)

(k)(3)

(k)(4)

(k)(5)

(k)(6)

(k)(7)

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute(A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for
withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency;

personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records or information ( A ) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such
disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual;

contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a
information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce
crime or apprehend criminals;

information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or
privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/heridentity
would be held in confidence;

material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant
to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian
employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished
information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the
release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person
who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FB1/DOJ

^ DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

S * FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

»'/r j DATE 12-10-2010

Memorandum

4

2£2h/m

(U) / /

V \J

\A ,

^ MRE AT _ AS. S ESS MtlNT. OfJ(PRO-KH OMEI NI
^§SlITE„^CTf^ITIES < IN''UNfi’ED-~^YATES -

fTERROSTfiT '

AO Adw. _
E**« AD l«v.."

E.m’aD les _

At«t. Dir.:

Arfro. S.rv», *_

Crim, Imv,

Id.nt.

Imp.

lnt.il

Lffb.

L*jol Cmih. _
Olf, Cong. &
PuSUe AfU. .

R.c. Mgrtf,

T*ch. S.rv«, _
Training

T.I.phen. Rm. _

5t«'y .

t fife t .Sl^fFlSl

PURPOSE: To submit attached summary, " sefsr^e^^

Kg\'' (U) Pro- Khomeini Activities In The United States . (tQ |

O^gQMMENDATI ON : That this summary . be approved for dissemination

Jr ' to the intelligence c ommun i ty . * £B3

, \y“ I jtti ’PROVED: Adm Servs. - / Laboratory " ~ / / n«,

A ' U - .... Crim Ccvn f

G ERRORIS't ■ RESEAROH^S^ltWl^^r^
ENTER (TRAC) , OPERATIONAL MATTER-;

,! j S& K \

in #fJ

•PROVED:

Adm. Servs^
Crim. I nv/fo

Dira'.tor

Exac . AD-Adrr .
Exec. AQ-inv.

Excc. AD-LS 3

;?,lnspactton_
Inteil.

Cvl. n{ Cong.

"ffPOHjC ASS.;

Reo. >Afjnt.

Tccti. Ssrvs.

Traiiiina

D_ ETAT-LS : Attached summary was prepared in response to the increased q
.. c . ® ctivi ty of pro-Khomeini Shiite terrorist groups against ^
United States interest in the Middle East and the threat of such S
activity occurring in the United States. TRAC has undertaken this £
project to. determine the threat potential to the continental 2 :

United States-.T^^ p :

.'This project has been coordinated by |

Intelligence Research Specialist, TRAC, Terrorism Section, Criminal
Investigative . Division, ifel/

A M AT ! G H C OT

HEREIN

entirety u
Enclosure

All information herein is classified

loted otherwise.

&3.VJ

SJS&^ET

CLASSIC

DECLASS

fied "SE^EET" in its

" Trl isJfv.

[ED BY G-3
LFY ON : OADR

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8 1984

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED BY
DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (BRC )
DATE: 01-11-2011

THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF PRO-KHOMEINI SIIIITE
ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES

This communication is classified "
unless otherwise indicated.

SECRETE NOFORN
CLASS I MED BY G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Secrej^oforn" in its entirety.

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SEGtfOST/NOFORN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ,

I. THE SHIITE RELIGION ]_

II. OFFICIAL IRANIAN DIPLOMATIC 4

ESTABLISHMENTS - IRANIAN
GOVERNMENT AFFILIATED OFFICES

Iranian Mission to\the United Nation 5

Iranian Interest Section . 6

Islamic Education Center 7

Mostazafin Foundation..-., 8

MAIN IRANIAN SHIITE ORGANIZATIONS'.
ACTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES

Muslim Student Association-

Persian Speaking Group 10

Islamic Society H

Islamic Guerrillas of America 12

IRANIAN SHIITE THREATS 14

CONCLUSION.

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Within the past year, terrorist acts have been
committed in the Middle East against diplomatic establishments
and military bases of the United States and several of its
allies. These actions, the purpose of which is to rid the
area of the Multinational Forces, have resulted in' extensive
damage and in numerous deaths and injuries. Beirut, Lebanon,
has been the principal site of much of this activity, although
other Middle Eas£ states have not escaped the actions of the
terrorists..

fhe gfoup that generally has claimed credit for these
is a fanatic fundamentalist sect of the^g fslamic Shiite
lion . whose leader is Ayatollah Khomeini^ oT^T^hd^I^larmfiFTtepublic-
Tranr— ^ This group, Islamic Jihad, is one of several factions
of the 3 religion that consider themselves to be in a holy war.
Although not all Shiites adhere to this philosophy, those who
do, believe tdjat po sacrifice is too great in furtherance of
their cause .

The United States is one of several nations viewed as
an enemy by the fanatic Shiites in their struggle, and there is a
concern that the terrorism currently confined to the Middle East
may soon spread to the United States. Many Shiites, of Iranian
and other Middle East nationalities, reside in the United States.
Many of these individuals are involved in several Shiite organiza-
tions, such as" the. Islamic Society, the Muslim Student Association-
Persian Speaking Group, and the Islamic Guerrillas of America. N
Should Shiite oriented violence. occur in the United States,
these organizations and/or their members could provide a support
base. Moreover, the official Iranian establishments, such as
the Mission to the United Nations and the Interest- Section, '
could be expected to provide guidance and financial support,.

Current information indicates that activities, s
as intelligence gathering and violent confrontations, are being
conducted by members- of... these Shiite organizations against, and
limited to, anti-Khomeini elements in the United States. Futher-
more, funding and direction for these actions emanate from th
Government of Iran through the various Iranian establishments .

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The major terrorist problem currently confronting
the United States uLn the Middle East is based in a deep
religious fanaticism .found in the fundamentalist sect of
the Islamic Shiite faith. The s^r’itual leader of the world's
Shiites, the A yatollah Ruhol lahffiKhomeini . who is also the
temporal leadgT^f^the^I^l'amic^R'gpubiic 1 o'r'^ iran , serves as the
manifestation both of this religious fervor ancf 0 secular power.
Fanatic fundamentalist Shiites kre in a state of holy war against
those in opposition to their philosophy, which includes the
United States. As such, they believe .that salvation can be
obtained through martyrdom. Centuries ago, during the Crusades,
this was accomplished by attacks with knives; s tCLdaVx the same is
gained by use of explosives-laden trucks.

The Shiite Moslems represent the Iranian', or Persian,
variation df--t.be Islamic religion. The beginnings of Islam can
conservatively be- .traced to the prophet Mohammed in the sixth
and seventh centuries A. D. His teachings unified the majority of
the Arab world and caused -the Koran (the words of Mohammed) to
be held as law in both civil and religious matters. An
important aspect of Islam is that there is no discernable
distinction between church and state. Interpaj^tatioji of the
religion is used to legitimize the state.

Following the death of Mohammed in'A.D. 6S2, there
resulted a succession of struggles in the faith. A schism,
which continues into the present, occurred between two religious
leaders, Ali and Abu Bakr. The followers of Ali, the Shiites,
appear to adhere more closely to the actual teachings of the
Koran as law. The other group, the Sunnites, who possibly are
the followers of Abu Bakr, appear to be more liberal and
realistic. The Shiite sect differs from the Sunnite sect in
matters of law and ceremony. They have, moreover, rejected
most of the oral traditions of Islam and believe in the coming
of a Messiah. ^JThe Sjannite sect is considered the orthodox branch
of Islam. TM(

The'" Sunnites are the majority Islamic sect, comprising
85 per cent of all Arabs. Most of the Moslems in Turkey, the
Far East, Afghanistan, and Africa, are Sunnite. The Shiites, by
comparison, are -.centered in Iran (formerly Persia) where approxi-
mately 90 per cent' of the population (1979 estimate) belong to
the sect. Other important Shiit^_poijimunities exist in Iraq,

Yeme

ten, Pakistan,, and Oman .

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The Sunnites, historically, have held positions of
leadership in the,. Middle East and have dominated the wealth.

The rise to power of Khomeini in 1979, however, began to change
this. Khomeini has sought to move Shiites into leadership roles
in the states of the Persian Sulf by any means, including
violence. This Islamic Revolution, therefore, is an attempt
to spread the Shiite interpretation' -of Isl^m through political
destabilization of other Arab states.

The fundamental concept of the Shiitfe philosophy
emphasizes strict obedience to the religious leader, that is,
Khomeini. His followers are faithful to his views and perform
and act accordingly. This fundamentalist zeal, when combined
with an intense Persian/Iranian nationalism, has given rise to
several fanatic factions, to whom no sacrifice is too great.

As Khomeini has justified the use of violence to further the
Revolution "through his strict interpretation of the religion and/or
the Koran, the religion (or its interpretation) becomes the
justification for any act.. And, to be sure, Khomeini's inter-
pretation is unquestioned. "Thus, it is not the religion itself
but the interpretation of religidtts -teachings , as viewed by the
spiritual/temporal leader, which is the "driving fo^ce behind
the Islamic Revolution and its consequences . ,

"As part of his effort to expand and consolidate the
Islamic Revolution, Khomeini has provided aid to dissident groups
in neighboring Gulf .states and has trained agents for attacks
against. ..exiled regime opponents. Tehran's subversive acts are
most likely used to protect Iran's own revolution and to foster
the emergence of Islamic fundamentalist- regimes sympathetic to
..Iranian interests. They are also designed to reduce superpower
influence in the Middle- East, (NC , OCj wC Lor u^jl

In its commitment to spreading the Islami^'^&volution ,
the Khomeini Government has been heavily involved in training and
equipping Islamic fundamentalist groups for the subversion of
several Gulf .countries, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and
Iraq. Available information, indicates that Iran has run, at
least since 1981, special paramilitary/terrorist training ppmps
under the direction of the Revolutionary Guards . (NC ,. ,CC)

rSt^ssJLl Shiites are fanatic to the point of self-sacrifice
Indeed, there are Shiites who accept Khomeini as a religious leader,
and even as a political leader, but who are not involved in the
terrorism. Thus, there exists within the Shiite philosophy a range
of followers encompassing, on one extreme, those who treat their
belief solely as a faith and, on the other extreme, those who
willingly martyr themselves to enforce and expand the teachings of
Khomeini.

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II.

OFFICIAL IRANIAN DIPLOMAT I
ESTABLISHMENTS - IRANIAN
GOVERNMENT AFFILIATED QE£1£E

I OUVL,

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Iranian Interests'Sec.tion

U

\ Following the seizure of the United States Embassy
in Tehran, Iran, by militant Shiites in November 1979, the
United States severed diplomatic relations with the Government
of Iran and ordered closed the Iranian^Enibassy in
Washington, D.\C. In June 1980, the ^anian.j:n-tere.S:feszS.e.efeion
(ISEC) was of-f^re.ially opened in Washington, D. C., to provide
the same services. as the Embassy, such as passport and visa
matters. Because the United States and Iran had no official
relations, however , ISEC^ af fairs were to be coordinated through
the -Algerian Embassy;.'

By mandate .'qf tfite United States Department of State,
ISEC is to be staffed by United States persons whose number
is not to exceed 20. Investigations -have determined, however,
that there are in excess of 50 full and part-time employees.

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lamic Education -Centgr

klslami

Muslim can visit the IEC;
&a.t i - K home i n i reportedly
jSA cu,dZ! , ! <j30) 03. /ylrtfi.'

Conversely,

Th^ >lslamic„Education~ Center ( IEC) .> located in
Potomac, Ma^y^^HT^serves two functions in ‘'the Islamic emigre
community': “Overtly, it is an education center, a religious
meeting site, and a social gathering place. An Islamic
Sunday School is held for religiouS-.instruction , and meetings
are conducted for translating t he Koran.. These activities are
coordinated by| | In addition, there is a

Muslim School , grades l - iz, during the week. Anyone who is

however, those Iranians who *

rould not be entirely welcomed

.is information that the IEJ2 / ma>\ >
be used as a cover organization and that it serves as a base
for,, terrorism and/or covert intelligence-gathering ac tivities
under the direction of a f oreian_.p.ower ( i . e . , Iran) |,

J |of the Islamic Guerrillas of

** Km'eriea-.i.iGA-)-, —maintains a high profile at the Center. He has
no connection to the school, but his purposes for using the
facility, other than that they are political in nature, are
unknown. There is concern within the intelligence community
that IGA activities are "tainting” the Center... X

camples of questionable activity at the IEC

include:-

- armed guards in camouflage dress on patrol;

- contacts with Muslim Student Association-Persian
Speaking Group students throughout the United States

"-'individuals from the Center who are observed
gathering intelligence at anti-Khomeini
demonstrations; andYxJ

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- the use of the IEC to house indivic
in pro-Khomeini damoir.strations .

ials who engage

The IEC was purchased by the Government of Iran with
monies from the Mostazafin Foundation j,n New York, through which
it receives regular support funds.
f&Vyvu.id' tMM - •"

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The Mostazafin Foundation

]k

h

Thd yMostazaf in Foundation ,(.MF ) , also known as
■los'tazaf an r a~'thqfC ^ 6 ~f ' '‘oppres'se^ peoples , " was formerly

i nr, and was founded during the

regime of | . fit is currently closely aligned with

the incumbeht . Ionian Government. The Foundation has two locations

the^

knowli-

iir^nian

ill NewYork City

The MF was chartered m the State of New York as a
non-prof i't- organization, but was later found to be a "front"
for the Iranian Government to channel funds to agents in the
United States in an effort to spread propaganda and to ascertain
the identities of anti-Khomeini students currently enrolled in
colleges and universities.. Investigations have determined that
the ,MF advocates the use of -intimidation of family members
in Iran when an Iranian student in the United States is
identified as having either expressed anti-Khomeini views or
violated the tenets of his Moslem faith-

The MF experienced conflict with the Iranian Interests
Section and with the administration af the Iranian Mission
to the United Nations; As a result, new officers were
selected to head the Foundation, and Tehran is now in complete
contro l nf An jr r ■; r. f farf ng the MF ' S daily 00^:3 t-i one

UfrflS bfien.-appointed l ■ ..

anajj lhas been appointed) |

It has been Hpt-p-rm-i na rl that thg> MF ic on rrnnt 1 1 > t| cing
serious financ ial difficulties. 1 —

_^^^___^^_Jana an aavisor to the
| to postpone payment of a 1.5 million
dollar tax obligatioh 'VAIM. tne Foundation currently owes to the
United States Internal Revenue Service. Moreover.,.. ..in light of
the Foundation's impending financial difficulties, it is curren
unable to issue student loans to anyone in the foreseeable futur

*f UUIlUarion , remmaeuj^

ltly
life.

The MF finances its activities, in part, by renting
high priced office space in one of New York City's more fashionable
locations. Investigations have determined that besides the income
which- -the. Foundation has obtained through the rental of office
space, an undisclosed amount of money has been sent to the
Foundation by the Khomeini regime ^to finance demonstrations,
publications, and various slogans.

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III ,

frlAIN IRANIAN SHIITE ORGANIZATIONS
ACTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES

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funding operations ofthe organization appear to be in
Washington, D. C. Investigations, for example, have determined
that funding for the PSG comes' from tJ^g^r apian Foreign Ministry
through the Iranian Interest Section..

The MSA-PSG serves as an extension of the present
regime in Iran and operates on United States campuses to silence
opposition through acts of intimidation and/or terror. The
main targets of the MSA-PSG are Iranians who are in opposition
to Khomeini or who are monarchists. Several incidents of violence
and heckling of opposition elements have been reported. At
Oklahoma University in Norman, Oklahoma, in March 1982, MSA-PSG
members were armed with knives, tear gas, and a number of weapons
used in the martial arts in a confrontation with anti-Khomeini
students. Moreover, investigations have determined that 30
MSA-PSG/IS members traveled (date unknown) to Iran and there met
with authorities concerning measures to counter opposition

The?te are also indications that the PSG acts as the
information-gathering arm of the Iranian intelligence service,

' SAVAMA. i

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Th

is made

■effl slami
: 'U$— of-a

Islamic" Society

C lslamic .Society ., a lso known a.
ip ^ " ~~ J

ioman Islamie,.

■*.— - — "ZjJ

which is made’ ‘hp'~of~"a' _ humber of groups variously - 'ret err ed to
as An j oman, the Hezbollah (Party of God) or Muslim Student
Association-Persian Speaking Group (MSA-PSG) , is comprised
principally of pro-Khomeini.. Iranians . This or ganizati on ^Derates
primarily through the MSA-PSG, .which is a group =3 glner'aliy
accepted on m*nv mllpgp and university campuses in the rr~ , ^

Un ited.. States . 1 lof the Society in the U nited States

is | | of Akfon, Ohio. |_ I

he

]b 7

of 'Washington, D. . , " is the main Islamic Society
Iranian Interest Section (ISEC) , Washington, Die,

t with the

The Islamic Society fulfills numerous tastings on
behalf of the Government of Iran, including gathering intelligence
on anti-Khomeini Iranians' "and covertly shipping embargoed
United States technology to Iran. In addition, the Society is
also involved .in spreading propaganda to further the Islamic
Revolution of Khomeini. This is accomplished through meetings,
publications such as. magazines and brochures, demonstrations,
and forceable takeovers of Islamic Mosques., The latter is an
attempt to spread the fundamentalist Shiite religion and make the
philosophy dominant, as is Khomeini’s intent. Other areas of
activity include financing and coordinating pro-Khorneini
activities in the United States, such as demonstrations; providing
defense costs for arrested pro-Khomeini activists; and disrupting
anti-Khomeini activities. Indications, therefore, are that .they s
society is used to promote pro-Khomeini violence and terrorism.. rSsf

The monies which help support the activities of the
Society are received from the Government of Iran, through ✓
either ISEC or the Mostazafin Foundation, New York
C HH,

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Islamic Guerrillas of America

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A

Thajplsl^rni c [| fluerrl.iaa-s.-raf~- Ameg^a (IGA) , also kno wn
ajlis As-sEura , Council of Guidance, is a socio-political,
ivmdam'e'ntal i s t “ShTite religious organ izatio n c omp rise d^of ^ ~ * s

Ameri^^n^BTadk~MusluL'in's^and"''f or eTgn-bor A "Mus.lims , manysjof whoa
are Iranians loyal to the present Iranian Government.

The IGA is a pro-Khomeini organization proyldingX.
support -for the Khomeini Revolution in the United States. The
IGA intends to facilitate change in American policy towards Iran
and halt what it feels is United States harassment of Iranian
people ^ ^ figure in the organiza-
tion is | t an- aaent of the Irania n Govern-

ment. All actions taken b y theT^gA must be cleared wi.thJ '***

before hpinn

lb 6
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3

e i -Ame-ra:can=B i lack Muslim CormiorTty

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Activity of the IGA is centered irr the Washington-f D.C.
area. One of its primary objectives - complete control of the
Islamic Center, 2551 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. , Washingt on. D.C.,
was. temporarily achieved in November 1981, when| |and his

follower's illegally wrested control from the Center ' s Board of
Governors. In March 1983, the Board of Governors regained
control of th e Islamic Center , which resulted in _the arrest and
conviction of | land several IGA members .

(U)

The IGA is involved in various activities "in support
of its cause. Pamphlets have been distributed, which berate
United States intelligence agencies, such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, for their alleged harassment
of Muslims. The IGA has conducted meetings at the Islamic Center
and at another location, the Islamic F.dncafion Center (IEC) on
Seven Locks Road, Potomac, Maryland. I I encourages

members to demonstrate support for the Iranian Revolution by
■staging marches. Source information indicates that Iran has
directed that more efforts be concentrated on new programs and
propaganda in order to at tract more American Black Muslims.

Also, it' i.s believed that *1 has traveled to Iran for

training in "intelligence gathering for the Iranian Government.
Members of the IGA h^v.e^ be^n observed wearing camouflage fatigues
and carrying weapons.

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. has been involved
i-ui. wm.cn some ftSttbers have been convicted

The' IGA,

in illegal activitife-p

and jailed. I I for example, was suspected of being

involved in tne assassination of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, for which two
IGA members were convicted in December 1981. Tabatabai, who
was a pro-Shah Iranian exile residing in Bethesda, Maryland,
was murdered in July 1980. Several United States federal officials
involved in terrorist investigation were the recipients of death
threat letters signed by the IGA in 1982. Moveover, investigations
reveal that weapons have been purchased by IGA members. Reportedly,
money for weapons procurement is obtained through robberies.

Various members of this group have been alleged to be responsible
for harboring the fugitives of these crimes, ^ ' - - - '

Sources have -rennrroA 1

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Although there have not yet been terrorist attacks
by Shiite, fundamentalists in the United States, there have
been numerous allegations relative to such activity. Increased
security measures have been put into effect at numerous United
States Government offices and buildings as a result, and
priority investigations have attempted to determine the validity
of the information and/or to interdict any threats. To date,
none of the intelligence has been substantiated. Included amonq
these allegations are :

" information obtained on Jaauam *

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Association-Persian Speaking Group.;.

- information obtained on January 1*8, 1983 from
a source of unknown reliability that two sites
.in Iran have been used to train terrorists for
the 1984 Olympics;'

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Ihveti tigatiilihS have documented smuggling-related
activity in the border area; rSTV^

- an anonymous letter received on November 22,

1983 by the Manassas, Virginia, Police Department,
in which the author overheard a conversation

concerning] — L

V

fc7D

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information obtained on December 14, 1983
regarding an anonymous telephone call to the
United States Embassy in Bern, Switzerland,
warning of possible kamikaze -style attacks
against famous "houses" in the -United States, to
include the White House and other 'Unspecified
targets. There were also reports of terrorists
carrying bombs aboard American flag oceanlinefs?

information from a source of unknown cali^bilix-y
who reported I I

>

X.

- information developed on December 20, 1983

through

agency

a source of another United States fiqyernment
concern i n<r

information obtained on December 30^ 1983
reporting that bombs would explode before
mid- January 1984., at the United Nations Building,
Pan Am Building, World . Trade Center ^apd/cjr the
Federal Building, in New York City;

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- inf ormation obtained on December 30, 1983,

time rrame was indicated, -
- information obtained frj

- information, which has not been substantiated"^
advising on January 4, 1984 of rumors of a plot
for a kamikaze-style mission against United States
installations (NFI) . Reportedly, the pilot is
Lebanese and is associated with Islamic Amal , a
Lebanese Sh^^ite fundamentalist group supported

by Khomeini

- information frorfr- a source of unknown

who reported!

- information obtained on January 18, 1984 that
package bombs have been prepared to explode when
in the possession of United States Postal Service
employees

- information obtained from
call on January 19. 1984 th;

-telephone

*- information from a source of another United st^t€

1 _ I 'me source ,

Who riaa- provided reliable information in tlm past,
was polygraphed and found to be deceptive. /

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In addition- to the allegations of Iranian terrorism
against United States Government targets, an incident recently
occurred in Seattle, Washington, wherein a pro-Khomeini Iranian
group, whose members are involved, with the Islamic Society,
planned to set fire to a theater during a performance attended
by pro-Shah and anti-Khomeini followers. Because of FBI actions
however, the plans were canceled. Although this incident did
not involve activity against United States Government facilities
it is of importance because it is an example of ' - the a
which the Shiites in the United States are capable'-of

/

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CONCLUS ION

That there have been no attacks perpetrated by fanatic
Shiite groups and/or individuals against United States Government
facilities or persons in the United States does not suggest that the
probability of such activity occurring is minimal. The threat does
exist, and it should be so viewed. The various violent anti-
Khomeini acts, such as the planned firebombing in Seattle, proves
that at least a psychological framework (that is, the ability to
commit and/or condone violence for a given cause) is in existence.

To be sure, this framework is necessary in establishing a terrorist
capability jThe extent of this capability, however, remains
unknown .

A support base, that is, avenues of escape, safehouses,
etc, does not exist in the United States to the same extent as in
the Middle East. Furthermore, the same fanaticism which generates
the suicide missions in the Middle East may not be as Btrong here,
given that the majority of the Shiites in America are either Arabs
who have been removed from the environment which spawns the
fan^tacisp, or they are Americans who have never fully experienced
it.

If, therefore, an attack were to occur in the United
States, it is least likely that it would be a suicide-style mission,
similar to the Beirut, Lebanon, bombings of the United States
Embassy and Marine Corps compound. Alternative methods, which would,
provide a high profile, include assassinations and kidnappings ^V'o'

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